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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the notion of decision-
theoretic deliberation, which studies the relation
between classical game and decision theory on the
one hand, and agent theories of deliberation on the
other hand. We aim at modelling the commonsense
notion of intention in systems which are self-aware
of their bounded reasoning power concerning their
decisions. We propose a transparent decision theo-
retic deliberation model that contains besides stan-
dard actions that change the world and standard ac-
tions that only change the information state of the
agent (capturing the standard notion of the value of
information), also actions that change the agenda
of the agent. The agenda contains book keeping
of the agent’s decision theoretic planner, for which
we use the DRIPS planner, and is used to deal with
bounded resources, such as the trade-off between
further deliberation or starting to execute actions,
or whether to change the agenda in case of unex-
pected observations. This model is the basis of
our study of intention. Creating an intention cor-
responds to putting something on the agenda, and
reconsidering intentions corresponds to removing
things from the agenda. We show that, in contrast
to Cohen and Levesque’s approach that deﬁnes in-
tention in terms of commitment, our treatment of
commitment is based in terms of well understood
concepts that consider both creation and reconsid-
eration of intention. Consequently, intention can-
not be deﬁned locally in a state of the world, but
only globally. Moreover, in contrast to abstract ap-
proaches such as Rao and Georgeff’s characteriza-
tion of intention in terms of commitment strategies,
we relate intention to planning. Finally, in contrast
to Bratman’s theory of intention, we do not restrict
ourselves to classical planning but we incorporate
insights from more recent decision-theoretic plan-
ning. We illustrate our decision theoretic deliber-
ation model and the related characterization of in-
tention by a detailed example.
1 Introduction
Agent theory proposes to model the behavior of complex
software systems in terms of commonsense mental attitudes
like belief, desires, goals, intentions and obligations, rang-
ing from, e.g., the PRS system [Rao and Georgeff, 1992] to
the more recent BOID architecture [Broersen et al., 2002]
and normative multiagent systems [Boella and van der Torre,
2006]. Decision-theoretic deliberation captures concepts
and reasoning mechanisms from agent theory in standard
decision-theoretic terms. Thus far, several partial results
have been obtained. The relation between beliefs as well
as defaults and probabilistic techniques has been studied for
some time; there are characterizations of desires and goals
in decision-theoretic terms [Herzig et al., 2003]; there are
various interpretations of obligations and norms, for exam-
ple as social laws [Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1997], and there
are preliminary results on intention [Boella, 2002b]. See the
comparison paper [Dastani et al., 2003] for an overview.
The most problematic issue in decision-theoretic delibera-
tion appears to be the characterization of goal and intention.
Roughly, whereas beliefs have been related to probabilities,
desires to utilities, and obligations to social laws, goals and
intentions do not seem to have an obvious counterpart in clas-
sical game or decision theory. Since most discussions on the
popular BDI model have focussed on the role of intention in
deliberation [Bratman, 1987], we believe that intention is a
benchmark example of decision-theoretic deliberation. Goals
are more difﬁcult to characterize than intentions for several
reasons. First, goals have been studied for a longer time and
in more depth, and therefore many different kinds of goals
have already been deﬁned and used. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, as observed by [Doyle, 1980], goals have a desir-
ability aspect as well as as intentionality aspect, and therefore
have a more complex structure. Goals have been character-
ized by [Simon, 1955] as utility aspiration levels, a kind of
utility threshold, but [Boutilier, 1994] argues that the result-
ing notion of goal must be generalized, and deﬁnes goals in
terms of ideality (that express the desirability of states) and
the agent’s knowledge. Thirdly, goals can be adopted from
other agents. Summarizing, the notion of goal is more prob-
lematic than is often assumed [Dastani and van der Torre,
2002], but for a characterization of decision-theoretic delib-
eration it seems better to start with the notion of intention.In our decision-theoretic model, goals are ﬁxed sets of states
build into the underlying decision-theoretic planner.
Intention has been related to choice and commitment [Co-
hen and Levesque, 1990], where choice can be interpreted as
a decision-theoretic notion, but commitment remains as difﬁ-
cult to characterize as intention itself. According to [Brat-
man, 1987] it is commitment that distinguishes intentions
from other motivational attitudes such as goals. The stability
of commitment means two things: ﬁrst, “intentions resist re-
consideration and in that sense have inertia” [Bratman, 1987,
p.30]. The rationale behind commitment is the resource-
boundedness of agents ([Simon, 1955]): agents cannot af-
ford continuous reconsideration and revision of their inten-
tions. Second, it is irrational to maintain an intention without
ever reconsidering it when the world changes. Only systems
which are self-aware of their bounded reasoning power con-
cerning their decisions are able to trade-off the effort devoted
to planning with the need of reconsidering their plans. So the
question becomes: under what circumstances does it make
sense to reconsider [Schut and Wooldridge, 2001]? For sim-
ilar reasons, [Zilberstein and Russell, 1993] propose a meta-
deliberation approach to reasoning under bounded rationality.
In other words, whereas beliefs, desires, and obligations can
be characterized by acceptance conditions [van der Torre and
Tan, 1999; Veltman, 1996], intentions are typically charac-
terized by their dynamic properties, such as persistence and
reconsiderationconditions. Finally, theoriesofintentionwere
developed in the context of resource bounded planning, e.g.,
[Pollack, 1990], but have not taken advantage of recent de-
velopments in decision-theoretic planning and qualitative de-
cision theory.
Our approach to decision-theoretic deliberation – includ-
ing the characterization of intention – is based on an ab-
stract decision-theoretic model of deliberation in self-aware
systems which can express the execution of both normal ac-
tions and deliberation actions. We start from [Boella, 2002a;
2002b] on intentions in the context of a decision theoretic
planner, called DRIPS [Haddawy and Hanks, 1998]. This
work implicitly contains a notion of intention. However, the
deﬁnition is hidden in the algorithm executed by the plan-
ner. To get results concerning intentions, one would have to
do extensive simulations, which are difﬁcult to interpret. We
therefore present a transparent deliberation model with a de-
cision theoretic interpretation which provides the basis of a
study of intentions. We then distinguish between a static and
dynamic external world.
Static world. In a static world, in which no unexpected ob-
servationsoccur, theagent onlyfacesa tradeoffbetween
deliberation and acting. We assume that if the agent de-
liberates, then it puts plans on the agenda. When the
agent starts executing, he chooses randomly a plan that
ﬁtstheagenda. Puttingthingsontheagendacorresponds
to the creation of an intention. Using the DRIPS plan-
ner technology, the agent is able to compute upper and
lower bounds on expected utility of plans, and therefore
can estimate whether further deliberation is worth the ef-
fort, given the time discount on its utility function. This
captures the resource bounded nature of intentions, but
it does not capture the fact that intentions can be recon-
sidered, or that the agent is committed to its agenda.
Dynamic world. When the world changes, the agent has a
trade-off between updating the agenda, or deliberating
about a new agenda. We say that an agent is committed
to a plan on the agenda, when it does not automatically
removeitincaseofunexpectedchanges. Moreover, ifan
agent is committed to a plan in this sense, and it is put on
the agenda as described above in the simpler static world
case, then we say that the plan is an intention. Whether a
plan is an intention is therefore not a property that is de-
termined only by the point in which the intention is cre-
ated, but it is also determined by the point in which the
world changes and the plan might be dropped from the
agenda. Intention is therefore not a local property, but it
also has global aspects. In the deﬁnition of intention =
choice + commitment, this global character is hidden in
the deﬁnition of commitment. And this is therefore the
reason that this deﬁnition is non informative.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains the
deﬁnitions of the deliberation model. Section 3 contains an
example to illustrate the use of the deﬁnitions. Section 4 dis-
cusses in more detail how intention can be analyzed in terms
of this model. Related work and conclusions end the paper.
2 Deliberation Model
We ﬁrst distinguish between the planning environment and
the states of the system. The planning environment is ev-
erything we consider to be ﬁxed for the planning agent. In-
spired by the DRIPS planner, the planning context consists
of the propositional variables (X), containing actions or de-
cision variables (A) ordered in an hierarchy (H). Actions
without descendants are called atomic, other actions are ab-
stract. Plans are sequences of actions, if they only contain
atomic actions then they are called primitive plans, otherwise
partial plans. The hierarchy tells us indirectly how partial
plans break down in other plans. Moreover, we assume that
the roots of the action hierarchy are goals. In other words,
the hierarchy only contains compositions of actions for pre-
ﬁxed goals. Finally, using the planner DRIPS [Haddawy and
Hanks, 1998] we are able to model partial plans (deﬁned by
[Bratman, 1987] as intentions) with associated utility esti-
mates. Two partial functions U¡ and U+ represent the time-
discounted utility of the outcome of the best and worst prim-
itive plan subsumed by plan, given a context.
We write A¤ for the set of ﬁnite sequences built from A,
and Lit(X) for the set of literals built from X, and R for the
set of real numbers.
Deﬁnition 1 (Planning Environment)
A planning environment is a tuple
hX;A;H;U¡;U+i where X is a set of propositional
variables, A µ X is a set of actions, and H µ A £ A¤ is a
ﬁnite hierarchy that relates each action with a set of sequence
of actions, and U¡;U+ : Lit(X) £ A¤ ! R are partial
functions from sets of literals built from X and sequences
of actions to real numbers, such that for s 2 Lit(X) £ A¤,
U+(s) ¸ U¡(s). If (a;(a1;:::;an)) 2 H then doing all ofa1;:::;an is a way to see to it that a. Since H is a relation,
there may be several ways to decompose a. The following
notions are deﬁned in a planning environment:
² AA = fa j69A0 µ A;(a;A0) 2 Hg. Atomic actions are
actions without successors in the hierarchy,
² BA = A n AA. Abstract actions are actions that are not
atomic,
² P = A¤. A plan is a ﬁnite sequence of actions.
² PP = AA¤. A primitive plan is a plan with no abstract
actions,
² AP = P n PP. A partial plan is a plan which is not
primitive,
² (a1;:::;an) · (a1;:::;ai¡1;b1;:::;bm;ai+1;:::;an)
iff (ai;(b1;:::;bm)) 2 H. The ordering on plans is
derived from action hierarchy,
² G = fa j6 9a0 2 A;A0 µ A; such that a 2
A0 and (a0;A0) 2 Hg. A goal is an action without a
parent in the hierarchy.
A state in a planning environment is composed of an infor-
mation state I, an agenda ¢ containing a set of plans, not of
actions. The agenda may reﬂect the agent’s intentions, but it
may also contain all other kinds of information. Consider for
example an agenda which is kept by a secretary for her boss.
Thesecretarymakesallkindsofappointments, andmoreover,
when there are meetings she writes them down. However, she
doesnotknowwhetherherbossintendstoactuallygotothese
meetings. In this paper we assume that the agent will execute
a plan in its agenda, but it may be that it drops a plan as soon
as something unexpected happens.
Deﬁnition 2 (States) Let hX;A;H;U¡;U+i be a planning
environment. A state is a tuple hI;¢i, where I µ Lit(X) is
a set of literals built from propositional variables X, and the
agenda ¢ µ P is a set of plans.
A decision process is like a Markov decision process with
deliberation actions which change the state of the agent –
in particular its agenda – or execution actions which affect
the real world. There are two sources of non-determinacy in
our model. First, even in the ‘static world’ case in which the
world and the information state does not change, the agent
may execute a random action that is subsumed by its agenda.
The reason that we included this option in our model is that
our agent can now make a trade-off between deliberating –
which leads to a better plan but which also has a cost – and
executing actions randomly (given the agenda). The second
source of non-determinacy in our model is that the world may
change. As a consequence of some actions, the world may
change and assuming full observability, also the information
state changes. In general rewards can be assigned to states or
transitions; here we assign them to states.
Deﬁnition 3 (Decision process) A decision process is a tu-
ple hS;DA;T;Ri where S is the set of states deﬁned above,
DA a set of deliberation actions, T : S £ DA £ S !
[0;1] a transition function that associates with every pair of
states s;s0 and every deliberation action a 2 DA a prob-
ability in [0;1] such that for all s 2 S;a 2 DA we have
§s02ST(s;a;s0) = 1, and R a reward function describing the
value assigned to a state.
go_by_line1 go_by_line2
talk_slides talk_blackboard
go_by_bike go_by_bus
talk go
give_lecture
Figure 1: Example action hierarchy.
Our model is a decision-theoretic model of deliberation for
the following two reasons. First, we do not model the real
world, only the information state of the agent. After an obser-
vation, the agent does not know what the result will be. The
agent has at most some expectations about the world. Sec-
ond, we model the agenda as part of the state. One could also
model the agenda as part of the information state, but in this
way we are able to identify actions which are only concerned
with changing the agenda.
Deliberation actions DA have access to the agent’s inter-
nal state s 2 S and modify it by updating its information
according to observations and completed actions, and by up-
dating its agenda by reﬁning partial plans and selecting more
promising ones. Since the utility functions are partial, it is
possible that, to compare plans, the agent must compute the
utility of a plan in a new state. For simplicity, we assume that
the agenda deals with one plan at a time.
Deﬁnition 4 (Deliberation actions) For each d 2
frefine;execute;reviseg deﬁne T(hI;¢i;d;hI0;¢0i),
as follows:
Reﬁne I0 = I, and if p 2 ¢ the new ¢0 = (¢ n fpg) [
fp1;:::;png where p · pi, as deﬁned in terms of H,
such that p0 62 ¢0 when p · p0 and p0 · pi, and p00 62 ¢0
when U+(p00) < U¡(pi) for 1 · i · n.
Execute
If there is only a primitive plan (a1;a2;:::;an) 2 ¢,
information state I0 = I [ fa1g and agenda ¢0 = (¢ n
f(a1;a2;:::;an)g) [ f(a2;:::;an)g.
If the agenda contains partial plans or more than one
primitive plan p 2 ¢:
1. LetM bethesetofprimitiveplanssubsumedbythe
current agenda, where ·¤ is the transitive closure
of ·:
M = fp0 2 PP j p ·¤ p0 for p 2 ¢g.
2. Let E be the set of initial actions of M: E = fa1 j
(a1;a2;:::;an) 2 Mg.
3. Let Da be the set of sets of primitive plans with the
same initial action a 2 E:
Da = ffp1;:::prg j pi =
(a;ai1;:::;ail) and pi 2 M for 1 · i · rg
4. For each a 2 E, let I0 = I [ fag and let ¢0 be the
set of plans subsuming the primitive plans whose
ﬁrst action is a:
¢0 = fp0 j fp1;:::plg 2 Da and pi =
(a;ai1;:::;air) and
p0 · (ai1;:::;air) and 6 9p00p0 · p00; p00 ·
(ai1;:::;air); 1 · i · lg5. Suppose S0 be the set of states reachable by execu-
tion of a single initial action in E; then jS0j = jEj
and the probability that action a 2 E is executed is
jDaj=jEj.
Revise I0 = I, and if p 2 ¢ and 9p0 such that p0 · p
and 6 9p00 such that p00 · p and p0 · p00 then ¢0 =
(¢ n fpg) [ fp0g.
In order to construct a policy for the decision process, a re-
wardfunctionR isneeded. Therewardisbasedontheagent’s
internal state, in particular the lower and upper utility bounds
of the plans on the agenda. The agent will maximize its utility
by executing plans, thus the policy drives the agent’s planning
activity towards the best solution, taking into account its re-
source boundedness: reﬁning the current partial solution and
computing the utility require time, while the utility of a plan
is time discounted; so, the agent has bounded computational
resources when it has to build a solution.
Note that the deliberation actions of the decision process
consider partial solutions which thus have an uncertain out-
come, expressed by the lower and upper bound of a utility
function. As suggested in [Boella, 2002b], the reward func-
tion does not only consider the action with the least uncertain
outcome, but also the ambiguity of the outcome. For this rea-
son the reward function is deﬁned not only as maximizing the
outcome but also at minimizing the uncertainty of the out-
come by means of reﬁnement of partial plans.
3 Example
The example is based on the following scenario. Our agent
has the goal to give a lecture (give lecture) at the univer-
sity. But before starting his talk, he must ﬁrst reach the uni-
versity. Thus the abstract action give lecture corresponds
to a plan which contains the abstract actions go followed by
talk. The agent can reach the university by two alternative
ways: going by bus (go by bus), with a further choice be-
tween bus line 1 and 2 (go by line1;go by line2), or go-
ing by bike (go by bike). A talk can be delivered either us-
ing the blackboard (talk blackboard) or using some slides
(talk slides). This example hierarchy is shown in Figure 1.
The nodes of the tree are the actions; non-leaves are abstract
actions, for example go or talk. A sequence of (abstract)
actions is a plan. In the example, we denote a plan (a;b)
with notation a;b. A plan without abstract actions, such as
go by bike;talk slides, is a primitive plan.
Example 1 (Lecture)
X = A [ fraing
A = fgo by line1;go by line2;go by bike;
talk blackboard;talk slides;give lecture;go;
talk;go by busg
H = f(give lecture;(go;talk));(go;(go by bus));
(go;(go by bike));(go by bus;(go by line1));
(go by bus;(go by line2));
(talk;(talk blackboard));(talk;(talk slides))g
With respect to the literals X that make up the information
state of an agent, there are two kinds. Information result-
ing from observations, such as rain, or information resulting
from completed atomic actions, such as go by bike. In Fig-
ure 3 and 4 below this kind is markedwith a ‘*’. Alternatively
we could record the effects of actions, like at univerity as a
result of go by bike. Currently, the example does not contain
conditional actions nor effects.
The reﬁnement structure of partial and primitive plans of
the example is depicted in Figure 2. A node corresponds to
a set of states, namely those states that have the same partial
plan on the agenda. The branches of the tree represent the
reﬁnement steps. Please note that, for readability, we assume
in this example that the agent always reﬁnes the initial ab-
stract action of a plan, ﬁrst. If we drop this assumption, the
state space would be slightly more complicated. The utility
boundaries are shown too. In practice, utility boundaries are
calculated by the DRIPS planner. Roughly, this works as fol-
lows. For end states, we can check if the overall goal G was
reached. If so, the state gets a value of 0. If not, the state is
not even considered. From this value, we subtract the costs
of the actions to get to this state. For non-end states, we take
the minimal and maximal utilities of those states that can be
reached by a deliberation step from that state. Thus utilities
are propagated ‘upwards’.
In the scenario, let us suppose that our agent assigns a cost
of 0 to using the blackboard. Preparing slides takes an extra
effort: ¡1. Going by bike is for free, 0, but going going by
bus requires a fare: ¡1:5 for line 1, and ¡2 for line 2.
3.1 Static world
We ﬁrst consider a scenario where the world is static: apart
from the changes due to the execution of actions by the agent,
the world remains the same. In particular, what remains the
same is the assignment of utilities to the plans the agent is
committed to. Consider the following trace, which illustrates
that planning need not be completed before the agent can ex-
ecute actions.
s1 hfg;f(go;talk)gi ¡re¯ne !
s2 hfg;f(go by bike;talk)gi ¡execute !
s7 hfgo by bikeg;ftalkgi ¡re¯ne !
s8 hfgo by bikeg;ftalk blackboardgi ¡execute !
s9 hfgo by bike;talk blackboardg;fgi
Note that in state s2 the plan go;talk has been re-
ﬁned to go by bike;talk but not to go by bus;talk even
if they are both subsumed by go;talk. The reason is
that go by bus;talk with utility [-3,-1.5] is dominated by
go by bike;talk with utility [-1,0]. So go by bus;talk
can be pruned without loss, since all its possible reﬁne-
ments cannot perform better (-1.5) than any reﬁnement of
go by bike;talk, which has, at worst, utility -1.
For a primitive plan, there is only one way to execute it: by
performing the ﬁrst action. But if the agent has a partial plan
on the agenda, there are several ways to proceed. To execute
a partial plan we assume the agent chooses at random one of
the primitive plans subsumed by the partial plan and executes
the ﬁrst action. At the same time its agenda is constrained
to those partial plans which are compatible with the executed
action. Such a ‘jump’ is a useful option when the agent has
no time to deliberate.go_by_line2;
talk_blackboard
go_by_bike;
[0,0] [-1,-1]
talk_slides
[-3,-1.5]
go_by_bus; talk
[-2.5,-1.5]
go_by_line1; talk
go_by_line1;
talk_blackboard
[-1.5,-1.5]
talk_slides
go_by_bike; talk
[-1,0]
go; talk
[-3,0]
[-3,0]
give_lecture
[-2,-2]
go_by_bike;
talk_blackboard talk_slides
[-2.5,-2.5] [-3,-3]
go_by_line1; go_by_line2;
[-3,-2]
go_by_line2; talk
Figure 2: Partial and primitive plans, with utilities.
In the following trace the agent ‘randomly selects’ an ac-
tion, and executes it.
s1 hfg;f(go;talk)gi ¡execute !
s7 hfgo by bikeg;f(talk)gi
Since the agent chooses at random, the probabilities de-
pend on the number of primitive plans starting with the
same action. Consider for example state s0 with partial
plan give lecture. If the agent selects to execute, it has
to choose at random between the primitive plans subsumed
by give lecture. As is clear from Figure 2 there are 6 of
them. Two of these start with go by line1, two start with
go by line2 and two with go by bike. So there is a prob-
ability of 1=3 that the agent executes either of these ac-
tions. Note that in the resulting state the agent only has
the most partial plan compatible with the executed action on
his agenda. So in case of go by line1 the agenda contains
go by line1;talk rather than go by line1;talk blackboard
or go by line1;talk slides. Thus the transition probabilities
T from state s0 are as follows, where the states are labelled
as in Figure 3.
T(s0;execute;s5) = 1=3 T(s0;execute;s6) = 1=3;
T(s0;execute;s7) = 1=3 T(s1;execute;s5) = 1=3;
T(s1;execute;s6) = 1=3 T(s1;execute;s7) = 1=3
T(s2;execute;s7) = 1 T(s3;execute;s8) = 1
In this example we use the deliberation probabilities only for
combined reﬁnement and execution of actions; not for reﬁne-
ment itself, nor for revising. For these deliberations, the prob-
abilities are set to 1.
Figure3representstheresultingMDP.Forreasonsofspace
the name of the actions have been shortened and the name of
the deliberation actions abbreviated to E (execution) and R
(reﬁnement). Each state is represented by a box containing
the name of the state and the commitments of the agents. The
utility interval is next to the box. When an action has been
completed, it appears labelled with a star. Probabilities are
associated to the deliberation transitions.
Up to now we have not introduced the deliberation action
revise. The reason is that, if the world is not dynamic, it
makes no sense to revise ones agenda, since the best strategy
does not change: it would be only a waste of resources.
3.2 Dynamic world
Now the example is extended to cover a dynamic world. The
MDP is shown in Figure 4. We assume that, according to
the agent, the world has some probability to change while
the agent is performing a reﬁnement action, since it takes
time. If the world changes, primitive plans may not give
the same utility. For example, it is possible that it starts
raining, with probability 0:1. Moreover, the agent does
not want to get wet: utility -5. So the plans that include
going by bike now have utility boundaries of [-5,0] or
[-6,-5], depending on further costs, like -1 for slides. E.g.,
in state s2 the agenda contains go by bike;talk. The agent
must still decide whether to talk with or without slides.
While the agent is making this decision it may start raining
with a probability of 0.1, so that a reﬁnement can lead to
two different states. With probability 0:9 it leads to s3 =
hfg;fgo by bike;talk blackboardgi, and with probability
0:1 to state s24 = hfraing;fgo by bike;talk blackboardgi.
Even though in both states the agent has
go by bike;talk blackboard on its agenda, the utility
is different: [0;0] for s3 and [¡5;¡5] for s24.
By contrast, we assume that while the agent is executing
an action or revising its agenda the world will not change in
a way that affects the utility boundaries. This assumption is
sufﬁcient for studying the phenomena we are interested in.
Thus, the reﬁnement transitions from s0 are now changed:
T(s0;refine;s1) = :9 T(s0;refine;s22) = :1
T(s1;refine;s2) = :9; T(s1;refine;s23) = :1
T(s2;refine;s3) = :9 T(s2;refine;s24) = :1
T(s5;refine;s4) = 1 T(s7;refine;s8) = :9
T(s7;refine;s25) = :1
For states which do not involve going by bike, e.g., s5, the
fact that the world changes is not shown, since the rain does
not alter their utility.
The consequence of the introduction of a dynamic world is
that revision becomes meaningful. Revision (or expansion) is
denoted by X in Figure 4. By revision we mean that the agent
puts the least partial plan on the agenda that is subsuming the
current agenda: if ¢ = fpg and 9p0 such that p0 · p and
6 9p00 such that p00 · p 2 H and p0 · p00 then the revised
agenda is ¢0 = fp0g. For example, in state s2 the agent
has go by bike;talk on its agenda, while after the revision,
in state s1 the agenda contains go;talk which subsumes the
former. Therefore the utility bounds of go;talk include the
utility bounds of go by bike;talk.
A revision action is not always the inverse of a reﬁnement,
as for example between states s5 and s4. The reason is that
if the world changes, the utility assigned to plans can changegk: go by bike
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s0
[-3,0] [-2,0]
g: go
t: talk
gl: give lecture
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tb: talk blackboard
ts: talk slides
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E
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1/2 1/2
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[-2.5,-1.5] [-3,-2]
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Figure 3: The MDP in a static world.
too. Consider the reﬁnement of state s1. There are two possi-
bilities: s2 with probability 0:9 and s23 with probability 0:1.
While revising from go by bike;talk to go;talk in state s2
leads to state s1 again, revising the same agenda in state s23
leads to state s22: since the utility of go;talk subsumes the
utility of the plans of going by bike, if their utility changes,
the utility of go;talk changes too. It is now [¡6;¡1:5], and
not [¡3;0] like in state s1.
4 Discussion
In this paper, rather than specifying an algorithm for meta-
deliberation as in [Zilberstein and Russell, 1993], we rep-
resent meta-deliberation as a decision process driven by the
value of information provided by reﬁning partial plans.
When we consider concepts from cognitive science like be-
liefs, desires, goals, norms, intentions, et cetera, we do not
consider a single state, but we consider the whole MDP. Lo-
cal beliefs are represented by the information states, but more
generally the beliefs of the agent are reﬂected by the transi-
tion function of the MDP. For example, the probabilities as-
sociated with transitions are part of the beliefs of the agent
too. Likewise, desires are associated with utilities, but also
with the reward function of the MDP. In this paper we do not
consider goals or norms. Whether something is an intention
is when it gets put on the agenda, and stays there when things
change (depending on type of commitment strategy). We thus
consider two issues, the acceptance condition and the recon-
sideration condition. This can be paraphrased as follows:
intention = accepted and persists
In other words, instead of saying that intentions are choice
and commitment, we deﬁne it directly in terms of agenda.
Moreover, our decision theoretic reconstruction makes this
more precise, as follows.
Static world. The discussion in Section 3.1 tells us some-
thing about acceptance of intention. A minimal condi-
tion of intention is that there is a choice between putting
it on the agenda or not, and there is a preference for
putting it on the agenda. In our case, the alternative is
to execute a plan randomly, and there is a preference for
reﬁning a plan when the expected payoff of the new plan
pays for the costs of reﬁning the plan.
Dynamic world Moreover, Section 3.2. tells us something
about termination or reconsideration. When the infor-
mation state changes due to an action, such as in state
s23, then the agent can choose either to drop its agenda,
or to stick to it. For a plan to be called an intention, the
agent has to usually stick to its plan. In our decision-
theoretic model, it depends on the costs of reﬁnement,
and the expected beneﬁts.
The notion of intention can be made more precise by deﬁning
a measure that tells us when an agent often keeps his plans
on the agenda. If we increase the cost of deliberation, then
there will always be a point after which the agent does not
deliberate but sticks to its plans. In other words, there is al-
ways a cost threshold above which intentions are used into
the agent’s deliberation.
5 Related work
Several authors addressed the problem of decision making
under bounded rationality. The most prominent approaches
are the following.
[Boddy and Dean, 1994] proposed continuous deliberation
scheduling, a planning algorithm based on the idea that an
agent has a ﬁxed set of decision procedures to react to events
happening in the environment. The quality of the solution of
a decision procedure depends on the time given to the proce-
dure. Continuous deliberation scheduling is an algorithm that
schedules decision procedures to achieve the highest overall
satisfaction.
[RussellandWefald, 1991]’sdiscretedeliberationschedul-
ing algorithm is based on the idea that at every moment in
time an agent must deliberate or act. Discrete deliberation
scheduling is an algorithm that decides on the basis of the ex-
pected values of deliberation or action, whether to deliberate
or to act respectively.
[Russell et al., 1993] propose the notion of bounded opti-
mality: a perfectly rational agent will base its reasoning on
decision theory, given what it knows of the environment. In
practice, where agents reason in real-time, this type of ratio-
nality is not feasible, thus we have to select a subset of these
perfectly rational agents that are able to reason in real time.
These agents are called bounded optimal agents, and behave
as well as possible given their computational resources..1
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Figure 4: The MDP in a dynamic world.
In studying resource bounded reasoning, [Zilberstein,
1996] proposes to consider planning as a source of informa-
tion for the execution architecture, at the same level as sens-
ing. In this paper we are inspired by this view of planning,
even if we adopted a formalism similar to the DRIPS plan-
ner. Like we do, Zilberstein uses a planning anytime algo-
rithm which improves the quality of its solutions as a func-
tion of time. Using [Zilberstein and Russell, 1996]’s classi-
ﬁcation, we consider the dimension of certainty for measur-
ing the quality of a plan. A conditional performance proﬁle
makes it possible to predict the advantage of planning a re-
ﬁned solution with respect to the current approximate one. In
our framework this performance proﬁle can be reconstructed
starting from the states of the MDP.
Some more recent proposals address the problem of the
relation of bounded rationality with the BDI model. [Schut
and Wooldridge, 2001] study how to model intention recon-
sideration in belief-desire-intention (BDI) agents. Since their
work is based on [Russell and Wefald, 1991], they assume
that at any moment in time the agent has some default action
it can perform. The agent can either execute this action or
deliberate, where deliberation can lead to a better action. By
contrast, in our work, we do not simply consider a default ac-
tion to be executed as an alternative to further deliberation.
We allow an agent to execute a random plan which is sub-
sumed by its current partial intention. In this way we model a
choice which has no computational costs, unlike for example
selecting an optimal plan.
[Schut et al., 2002] study the same problem by using the
theory of Markov decision processes (MDP) for planning
in partially observable stochastic domains. They view an
intention reconsideration strategy as a policy in a partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP): solving the
POMDP thus means ﬁnding an optimal intention reconsid-
eration strategy. Like in our work they represent both the
execution of normal actions and redeliberation actions in the
transitions of the MDP, and they build the optimal policy to
be used runtime, beforehand. The reward of executing an ac-
tion is the utility achieved by the action, while the utility of
redeliberation is indirectly deﬁned “as the expected worth of
future states in which the agent has correct intentions”. As
intentions resist reconsideration, the implementation of the
reward structure should thus favor action over deliberation.
Even if our research goal is similar, there are some impor-
tant differences with our work. First of all, we do not focus
on intention reconsideration, but we want to explain the very
notion of intentions by studying a rationally bounded agent
model. Second, in their work “the BDI agent can be seen as
a domain dependent object level reasoner, concerned directly
with performing the best action for each possible situation;
the POMDP framework is then used as a domain independent
meta level reasoning component, which lets the agent recon-
sider its intentions effectively”. By contrast, we do not have a
BDI agent model which is used as a deliberation component;
rather we translate the basic steps of an algorithm for BDI
agents as deliberation actions which determine the transitions
in the MDP. In this paper, for simplicity, we focused on the
deliberation actions of reﬁning a partial plan, revising the cur-
rent plan by making it more partial and executing primitive or
partial plans. In particular, we do not assume that a delibera-
tion action is able to lead the agent to a state where it intends
a new primitive plan. We provide a more ﬁne-grained model
where each step of the agent deliberation is mapped onto a
transition of the MDP. Third, since according to [Bratman,
1987] the notion of intention is related to partial plans, we
adopted a hierarchical plan formalism inspired on the DRIPS
planner. In this way we are able to study the bounded ra-
tionality of agents not only in terms of costs of deliberation
actions but also in terms of the value of information provided
by reﬁning partial plans.
6 Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn. Intentions can be
analysed as a side-effect of meta-reasoning on action and de-
liberation in systems which are self-aware of their bounded
reasoning power concerning their decisions. In general, de-vising a new plan has to overcome overhead costs. Continu-
ing the old plan is therefore more beneﬁcial, when the initial
utility differences are not very large. The stability, observed
as the major function of intentions, therefore automatically
comes out of a standard decision theoretic planning setting.
Intention gets essentially a dynamic semantics: a semantics
in terms of the changes to utilities.
Further research includes several issues. First of all, we are
introducing explicit observation actions which are executed if
the information they are likely to convey is worth the costs of
those actions. Second, we can introduce a more ﬁne grained
model of the deliberation process of an agent, e.g., by consid-
ering also a deliberation action of evaluating the utility of a
(partial) plan, with an additional deliberation cost. Third, we
are studying how different probability distributions and dif-
ferent costs of redeliberation strategies affect the persistence
of intentions. To aid in the experiments, a prototype imple-
mentation in Prolog is being constructed. This will also allow
experiments with more realistic examples.
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